{"id":274,"date":"2008-10-20T05:00:35","date_gmt":"2008-10-20T09:00:35","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/whamit.mit.edu\/?p=274"},"modified":"2008-10-20T11:51:26","modified_gmt":"2008-10-20T15:51:26","slug":"ling-lunch-1023-patrick-grosz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/2008\/10\/20\/ling-lunch-1023-patrick-grosz\/","title":{"rendered":"Ling-lunch 10\/23 - Patrick Grosz"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Please join us for this week&#8217;s Ling-lunch:<BR><br clear='none'\/>\n<A HREF=\"http:\/\/web.mit.edu\/grosz\/www\/\">Patrick Grosz<\/A><BR><br clear='none'\/>\n&#8220;Particle-izing Imperatives&#8221;<BR><br clear='none'\/>\nThursday, Oct. 23<BR><br clear='none'\/>\n12:30-1:45<BR><br clear='none'\/>\n32-D461<P><br clear='none'\/>\n>The semantics of imperatives has been in the focus of recent research such as<br clear='none'\/>\nPortner (2005, 2007) and Schwager (2005, 2006). Schwager assumes a covert<br clear='none'\/>\nperformative modal with universal force. Portner claims that imperatives do not<br clear='none'\/>\nencode modal force and suggests a pragmatic account in which imperatives<br clear='none'\/>\ncontribute to the hearer?s To-Do List and a rational speaker aims to realize<br clear='none'\/>\nas many entries on her To-Do List as possible. To account for the difference<br clear='none'\/>\nbetween universal, &#8220;commanding&#8221; imperatives and existential, &#8220;permissive&#8221;<br clear='none'\/>\nimperatives, Schwager (2005) develops a pragmatic account that crucially<br clear='none'\/>\nassumes that the hearer has already wanted to carry out the action expressed in<br clear='none'\/>\nthe imperative, but has felt that it was prohibited to do so (see also Han 2000<br clear='none'\/>\nin this context). In contrast, Portner (2007) suggests that such differences<br clear='none'\/>\nare linked to various sections of the hearer&#8217;s To-Do List, corresponding to<br clear='none'\/>\ndifferent ordering sources (e.g. orders are deontic and invitations\/permissions<br clear='none'\/>\nare bouletic, referring to the hearer&#8217;s  wishes). Crucially, both assume that<br clear='none'\/>\nimperatives always express &#8220;necessity&#8221; and the feeling of &#8220;possibility&#8221; is a<br clear='none'\/>\nderived effect. In this talk I show that this cannot be correct.<\/p>\n<p>>In this talk I revisit the semantics of imperatives in the light of the<br clear='none'\/>\nGerman discourse particles JA (pronounce: &#8220;stressed JA&#8221;, homophonous with ja<br clear='none'\/>\n&#8216;yes&#8217;) and ruhig (homophonous with ruhig &#8216;quietly&#8217;). These elements occur only<br clear='none'\/>\nin imperatives and in modalized declaratives, but not in non-modalized<br clear='none'\/>\ndeclaratives. They restrict the modal type of the modal operator they occur<br clear='none'\/>\nwith, and are sensitive to modal force (JA only combines with universal force<br clear='none'\/>\nand ruhig with existential force). I show that the distribution of JA and ruhig<br clear='none'\/>\ncan only be accounted for by assuming that imperatives contain a covert element<br clear='none'\/>\nthat introduces modal necessity or modal possibility. The empirical evidence<br clear='none'\/>\nthus favors an approach that assumes an element introducing modal<br clear='none'\/>\nquantification (such as Schwager&#8217;s) over an approach that does not involve<br clear='none'\/>\nquantification (such as Portner&#8217;s). However, it also requires a fundamental<br clear='none'\/>\nrevision of Schwager, in that we need to assume the imperative operator to  be<br clear='none'\/>\nlexically ambiguous between a universal necessity reading and an existential<br clear='none'\/>\npossibility reading.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Please join us for this week&#8217;s Ling-lunch: Patrick Grosz &#8220;Particle-izing Imperatives&#8221; Thursday, Oct. 23 12:30-1:45 32-D461 >The semantics of imperatives has been in the focus of recent research such as Portner (2005, 2007) and Schwager (2005, 2006). Schwager assumes a covert performative modal with universal force. Portner claims that imperatives do not encode modal force [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-274","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-talks"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/274","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=274"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/274\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":276,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/274\/revisions\/276"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=274"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=274"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=274"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}