Speaker: Wataru Uegaki
\nTitle: Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem
\nLocation: 32D-831
\nTime: Wednesday, Nov 9, 4:00PM-5:30PM (Please note the unusual day and time; Friday is a holiday)<\/p>\n
Abstract:<\/p>\n
\nThe Gettier problem (Gettier 1963) in epistemology concerns
\ncases of intuitively false knowledge attribution that is predicted to
\nbe valid by the traditional view that a knowledge consists of a
\njustified true belief. This problem can be recast as a puzzle for the
\nstandard semantic analysis of “know”. In the situation described in
\n(1), (2) is intuitively false. However, a semantics that equates
\nknowledge with justified true belief predicts it to be true.<\/p>\n(1) Smith justifiably believes that Jones owns a Ford. (He saw Jones
\nhaving a key of a Ford, washing a Ford etc.) He justifiably deduces
\nfrom this belief that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona
\nalthough he is unopinionated about Brown\u0092s whereabouts. It turned out
\nthat Jones in fact did not have a Ford, but Brown was in Barcelona.
\n(2) Smith knows that [Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona].<\/p>\nIn this talk, I will provide a new solution to this puzzle by giving
\n“know” a meaning that operates on a question-denotation (ie. a set of
\nalternative possibilities) even when it combines with a declarative
\ncomplement, making crucial use of the proposals in Alternative
\nSemantics (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Alonso-Ovalle 2006 a.o.) and
\nInquisitive Semantics (Groenendijk 2009, Groenendijk and Roelofsen
\n2009). In the proposed analysis, “x knows p” is true iff x has a
\njustified true belief of an alternative contained in p, and x has no
\njustified belief of any stronger alternative. I will also claim that a
\nnatural extension of the current proposal accounts for the selection
\nrestrictions of other attitude predicates, such as “believe” and
\n“wonder”.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Speaker: Wataru Uegaki Title: Inquisitive knowledge attribution and the Gettier problem Location: 32D-831 Time: Wednesday, Nov 9, 4:00PM-5:30PM (Please note the unusual day and time; Friday is a holiday) Abstract: The Gettier problem (Gettier 1963) in epistemology concerns cases of intuitively false knowledge attribution that is predicted to be valid by the traditional view that […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3262","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-talks"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3262","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3262"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3262\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3268,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3262\/revisions\/3268"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3262"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3262"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ling-phil.mit.edu\/whamit\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3262"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}